Reputation-based co-evolutionary model promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSLETA.2020.126233MaRDI QIDQ2238366zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yudong Gong, Yiguang Bai, Sanyang Liu

Publication date 1 November 2021

Published in Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126233

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationreputationco-evolutionprisoner's dilemma game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3168330 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5543872 (Why is no real title available?)
• Co-evolution of strategies and update rules in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
• Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks
• Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
• Cooperative behavior in \(N\)-person evolutionary snowdrift games with punishment
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Scale-free networks: a decade and beyond
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Statistical physics of vaccination
• THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION

Cited in

(19)

• Reputation-based probabilistic punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game
• Bilaterally-agree partner switching promotes cooperation in social dilemmas
• Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma
• The influence of own historical information and environmental historical information on the evolution of cooperation
• A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
• Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner's dilemma game
• Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation
• Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable
• Reputation-dependent social learning on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Modeling Implicit Collusion Using Coevolution
• Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
• Development of several studies on indirect reciprocity and the evolution of cooperation
• Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Promotion of cooperation in evolutionary snowdrift game with heterogeneous memories
• When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners' dilemma game?
• The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas
• Promoting cooperation using `kin' biased conditional strategy in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
• Indirect reciprocity with abductive reasoning

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