Reputation-based co-evolutionary model promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2238366
DOI10.1016/J.PHYSLETA.2020.126233zbMATH Open1479.91038OpenAlexW2999180259WikidataQ126398666 ScholiaQ126398666MaRDI QIDQ2238366FDOQ2238366
Authors: Yudong Gong, Yiguang Bai, Sanyang Liu 
Publication date: 1 November 2021
Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126233
Recommendations
- Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma
- When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners' dilemma game?
- Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner's dilemma game
- Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Scale-free networks: a decade and beyond
- THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Cooperative behavior in \(N\)-person evolutionary snowdrift games with punishment
- Statistical physics of vaccination
- Co-evolution of strategies and update rules in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
Cited In (19)
- Promotion of cooperation in evolutionary snowdrift game with heterogeneous memories
- Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Reputation-dependent social learning on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
- The evolutionary game of emotions considering the influence of reputation
- Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner's dilemma game
- Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable
- Development of several studies on indirect reciprocity and the evolution of cooperation
- A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
- Promoting cooperation using `kin' biased conditional strategy in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game
- Indirect reciprocity with abductive reasoning
- Reputation-based probabilistic punishment on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Bilaterally-agree partner switching promotes cooperation in social dilemmas
- The influence of own historical information and environmental historical information on the evolution of cooperation
- Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
- Modeling Implicit Collusion Using Coevolution
- When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners' dilemma game?
- Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma
- Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas
This page was built for publication: Reputation-based co-evolutionary model promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2238366)
