The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2024.128578OpenAlexW4391424700WikidataQ128899057 ScholiaQ128899057MaRDI QIDQ6130130FDOQ6130130

Authors: Weijuan Hao, Yuhan Hu 

Publication date: 18 April 2024

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2024.128578

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary gamePrisoner's dilemmadeep cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx) Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)

Cited In (1)

• Two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost in weak prisoner's dilemma

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