The implications of deep cooperation strategy for the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2024.128578MaRDI QIDQ6130130zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Weijuan Hao, Yuhan Hu

Publication date 18 April 2024

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2024.128578

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary gamePrisoner's dilemmadeep cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx) Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91Dxx)

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• Agent-based evolutionary game dynamics uncover the dual role of resource heterogeneity in the evolution of cooperation
• Two-stage strategy update rule based on learning cost in weak prisoner's dilemma

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