Bidirectional supervision: an effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games
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Publication:6160576
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Cites work
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- Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: experimental evidence
- Coupling group selection and network reciprocity in social dilemmas through multilayer networks
- Effects of defensive cooperation strategy on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma
- Effects of directional migration for pursuit of profitable circumstances in evolutionary games
- Effects of quasi-defection strategy on cooperation evolution in social dilemma
- Evolution of cooperation in heterogeneously stochastic interactions
- Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
- Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games
- Positive correlation between strategy persistence and teaching ability promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- Probabilistic reward or punishment promotes cooperation in evolutionary games
- Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
- Public cooperation in two-layer networks with asymmetric interaction and learning environments
- Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
- Social dilemma based on reputation and successive behavior
- Statistical physics and computational methods for evolutionary game theory
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game
- Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game
- THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION
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