Game-theoretic model of corruption in hierarchic control systems

DOI10.1134/S1064230710010168zbMATH Open1269.91018OpenAlexW2076459124MaRDI QIDQ2391786FDOQ2391786

Authors: K. I. Denin, Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ 

Publication date: 5 August 2013

Published in: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s1064230710010168

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Application models in control theory (93C95)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Equilibrium solutions of an auction game related to the model of privatization of indivisible boons under conditions of corruption

Cited In (22)

• Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption
• Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level
• Static models of corruption in hierarchical control systems
• Hierarchical Model of Corruption: Game-Theoretic Approach
• Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach
• A stochastic control model and dynamic control policy for bribery involving a dynamic pay
• The sustainable development of the management systems in the conditions of corruption
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the impact of corruption on managers' and controllers' behavior
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Mathematical modeling, analysis, and optimal control of corruption dynamics
• Two-stage game-theoretic model of inspection and embezzlement in a three-level control system
• Simulation modeling of the resource allocation under economic corruption
• Mathematical modeling on transmission and optimal control strategies of corruption dynamics
• Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
• Bidirectional supervision: an effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games
• Optimum parameters of hierarchical control structures
• Dynamic models of struggle against corruption in hierarchical management systems of exploitation of biological resources
• Dynamic models of corruption in hierarchical control systems
• Static models of struggle against corruption in hierarchical management systems
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Event corruption: a game theoretic approach

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