Game-theoretic model of corruption in hierarchic control systems
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Cites work
Cited in
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- Mathematical modeling, analysis, and optimal control of corruption dynamics
- Mean-field-game model of corruption
- The sustainable development of the management systems in the conditions of corruption
- Two-stage game-theoretic model of inspection and embezzlement in a three-level control system
- Static models of corruption in hierarchical control systems
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