Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2017.1388235zbMath1417.91423OpenAlexW2769277580MaRDI QIDQ4963392

Alberto A. Pinto, Elvio Accinelli, Filipe Martins, Luis G. Quintas, Jorge A. Oviedo

Publication date: 2 November 2018

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1388235

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydynamical stabilitycorruptionevolutionary theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

The power of voting and corruption cycles ⋮ On structural stability of evolutionary stable strategies ⋮ Evolutionary stable strategies and cubic vector fields ⋮ Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring

Cites Work

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• Corruption driven by imitative behavior

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