Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2017.1388235MaRDI QIDQ4963392zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elvio Accinelli, Filipe Martins, Alberto Pinto, Luis G. Quintas, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 2 November 2018

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1388235

zbMATH Keywords

corruptiondynamical stabilityevolutionary theorygame theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Social choice (91B14) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Corruption driven by imitative behavior
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2229941 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(17)

• On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
• On the cultural transmission of corruption
• Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring
• Game-theoretic model of corruption in hierarchic control systems
• Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
• A stochastic control model and dynamic control policy for bribery involving a dynamic pay
• Immunity
• Modeling the influence of public's memory on the corruption-popularity dilemma in politics
• The corruption prevention model
• The power of voting and corruption cycles
• Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption
• Building efficient institutions: a two-stage differential game
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a corrupt society with anti-corruption control
• On structural stability of evolutionary stable strategies
• Evolutionary stable strategies and cubic vector fields
• The hybrid matching of Hurwitz systems
• On the limit cycles of a quartic model for evolutionary stable strategies

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