The power of voting and corruption cycles

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2020.1818077zbMath1484.91356OpenAlexW3097899267MaRDI QIDQ5070522

Atefeh Afsar, Elvio Accinelli, Bruno M. P. M Oliveira, Alberto A. Pinto, Filipe Martins

Publication date: 13 April 2022

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2020.1818077

zbMATH Keywords

democracyreplicator dynamicsevolutionary game theoryheteroclinic cyclescorruptionsocial traps

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Asymptotic dynamics of Hamiltonian polymatrix replicators ⋮ Can the indifferent population affect the spread of rumors?

Cites Work

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• Corruption driven by imitative behavior
• Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

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