The power of voting and corruption cycles

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2020.1818077MaRDI QIDQ5070522zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elvio Accinelli, Filipe Martins, Alberto Pinto, Atefeh Afsar, B. Oliveira

Publication date 13 April 2022

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2020.1818077

zbMATH Keywords

corruptiondemocracyevolutionary game theoryheteroclinic cyclesreplicator dynamicssocial traps

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Corruption driven by imitative behavior
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

Cited in

(18)

• On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
• Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
• Vote-buying and growth
• Immunity
• Corruption and bicameral reforms
• A duopoly model of political agency with applications to anti-corruption reform
• Modeling the influence of public's memory on the corruption-popularity dilemma in politics
• Corruption and power in democracies
• Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption
• Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption
• Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
• Asymptotic dynamics of Hamiltonian polymatrix replicators
• Can the indifferent population affect the spread of rumors?
• Electoral decisions: the role of the government in power, the opposition and the voters. An approach from the perspective of game theory
• A tripartite evolutionary game model of ginger transaction under the ``regulation + target price insurance policy
• The hybrid matching of Hurwitz systems
• A tripartite evolutionary game model for the last-mile crowd-sourced delivery system
• A model of corruption on higher-order networks with long-time quasi-stationary solutions

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