The power of voting and corruption cycles
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Publication:5070522
DOI10.1080/0022250X.2020.1818077zbMATH Open1484.91356OpenAlexW3097899267MaRDI QIDQ5070522FDOQ5070522
Authors: Elvio Accinelli, Filipe Martins, Alberto Pinto, Atefeh Afsar, B. Oliveira 
Publication date: 13 April 2022
Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2020.1818077
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Cites Work
Cited In (14)
- Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
- Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption
- Immunity
- Can the indifferent population affect the spread of rumors?
- Electoral decisions: the role of the government in power, the opposition and the voters. An approach from the perspective of game theory
- Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption
- A duopoly model of political agency with applications to anti-corruption reform
- Asymptotic dynamics of Hamiltonian polymatrix replicators
- Corruption and bicameral reforms
- Corruption and power in democracies
- Vote-buying and growth
- A tripartite evolutionary game model of ginger transaction under the ``regulation + target price insurance policy
- Modeling the influence of public's memory on the corruption-popularity dilemma in politics
- Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
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