On the persistence of corruption

DOI10.1007/BF01250114MaRDI QIDQ677029zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Herbert Dawid, Gustav Feichtinger

Publication date 23 March 1997

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01250114

zbMATH Keywords

corruptionmultiple equilibriasocio-economic system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Application models in control theory (93C95)

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Cites work

• A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
• A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3991198 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1066239 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3992265 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
• On the Transversality Condition in Infinite Horizon Optimal Problems
• Optimal allocation of drug control efforts: A differential game analysis

Cited in

(20)

• Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
• Corruption across countries and regions: some consequences of local osmosis
• On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
• On the cultural transmission of corruption
• Some implications of the unofficial economy-bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries
• A dynamic analysis of Schelling's binary corruption model: a competitive equilibrium approach
• Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
• Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
• On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralized Economies
• OPTIMAL GROWTH, DEBT, CORRUPTION, AND R&D
• The emergence of deontological codes in public administration
• Corruption and Firms
• The power of voting and corruption cycles
• Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Complex dynamics in a growth model with corruption in public procurement
• Wheels and cycles: Suboptimality and volatility of corrupted economies
• Cracking down on bribery
• Petty corruption
• The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development

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