A dynamic analysis of Schelling's binary corruption model: a competitive equilibrium approach

DOI10.1007/S10957-013-0420-7MaRDI QIDQ2247908zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Jonathan P. Caulkins, Gustav Feichtinger, Dieter Grass, Richard F. Hartl, Peter M. Kort, Andreas J. Novak, Andrea Seidl, Franz Wirl

Publication date 30 June 2014

Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-013-0420-7

zbMATH Keywords

corruptionhistory versus expectationsintertemporal competitive equilibriaSchelling diagramthresholds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Optimality conditions for problems involving ordinary differential equations (49K15) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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Cites work

• Conditions for indeterminacy and thresholds in neoclassical growth models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734433 (Why is no real title available?)
• Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
• On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
• Optimal Control of Nonlinear Processes
• Social interactions within a dynamic competitive economy
• Thin versus thick CO\(_2\) market

Cited in

(5)

• On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
• Indeterminacy and history dependence of strategically interacting players
• Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
• Heterogeneous society in binary choices with externalities
• On the persistence of corruption

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