Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0068-1MaRDI QIDQ1022384zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Roy Radner, Mukul Majumdar

Publication date 22 June 2009

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/08-11.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(13)

• The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
• Organized vs. competitive corruption
• Strategic analysis of influence peddling
• Is it reasonable to legalize tea money?
• A dynamic analysis of Schelling's binary corruption model: a competitive equilibrium approach
• Intermediated corruption
• Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
• Decentralized bribery and market participation
• Petty corruption and citizen reports
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Struggle against the corruption cartel
• Corruption, market quality, and entry deterrence in emerging economies
• Petty corruption

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