Organized vs. competitive corruption

DOI10.1023/A:1016364505439MaRDI QIDQ1614145zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marco Celentani, Juan-José Ganuza

Publication date 3 September 2002

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

competitive and organized corruptioninstitutional response

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Decentralized bribery and market participation
• Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
• Fiscal policy and corruption
• Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
• The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development

Cited in

(13)

• Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
• Fiscal policy and corruption
• Intermediated corruption
• Corruption and Firms
• Organized crime, violence, and politics
• Decentralized bribery and market participation
• Does quality of openness affect corruption?
• Corruption and bicameral reforms
• A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption
• Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
• Some implications of the unofficial economy-bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries
• On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector
• Corruption and the case for safe-harbor regulation

This page was built for publication: Organized vs. competitive corruption

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1614145)