Cracking down on bribery
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Publication:892871
DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0883-6zbMATH Open1341.91028OpenAlexW2008635262WikidataQ57453926 ScholiaQ57453926MaRDI QIDQ892871FDOQ892871
Authors: Sheheryar Banuri, Catherine Eckel
Publication date: 12 November 2015
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/55531/1/Banuri_Eckel_Cracking_Down_12_31_2014.pdf
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- Interim bribery in auctions
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
Cited In (8)
- Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?
- The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
- The efficiency of crackdowns: a lab-in-the-field experiment in public transportations
- The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: some experimental evidence
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes
- Cracking down on bribery
- A restriction on lobbyist donations
- Corrupt police
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