Social dilemma based on reputation and successive behavior
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Publication:2189864
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2020.125358OpenAlexW3033406588MaRDI QIDQ2189864
Mingfeng He, Linpeng Wang, Qiuhui Pan
Publication date: 17 June 2020
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125358
Related Items (5)
Persistent imitation paves the way for cooperation in public goods game ⋮ Bidirectional supervision: an effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games ⋮ Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Wealth-based rule favors cooperation in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable ⋮ Modeling the social dilemma of involution on a square lattice
Cites Work
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- Evolution of cooperation on independent networks: the influence of asymmetric information sharing updating mechanism
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- Reputation-based adaptive adjustment of link weight among individuals promotes the cooperation in spatial social dilemmas
- Reputation-based popularity promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Effects of compassion on the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemmas
- Neighbor-considered migration facilitates cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Strong coupling corrections in the analysis of x-ray Thomson scattering measurements
- Influence of bolstering network reciprocity in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game: a perspective
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