Persistent imitation paves the way for cooperation in public goods game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2166509
DOI10.1016/J.PHYSLETA.2022.128302zbMATH Open1503.91030OpenAlexW4285010258MaRDI QIDQ2166509FDOQ2166509
Authors: Wenhui Dai, Jialu He, Fengyuan Yu, Xin Shen, Jianwei Wang
Publication date: 24 August 2022
Published in: Physics Letters. A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physleta.2022.128302
Recommendations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1361066
- Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game
- The effects of nonlinear imitation probability on the evolution of cooperation
- The evolution of cooperation through imitation
- Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with one-dimensional local interaction and imitation
Cites Work
- Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions
- Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
- Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices
- The persistence and transition of multiple public goods games resolves the social dilemma
- Effects of compassion on the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemmas
- Learning continuous and consistent strategy promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game with mixed strategy
- How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
- Heterogeneous investments induced by historical payoffs promote cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma
- Positive correlation between strategy persistence and teaching ability promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games
- Adaptive persistence based on environment comparison enhances cooperation in evolutionary games
- Social dilemma based on reputation and successive behavior
- Heterogeneous investment with dynamical feedback promotes public cooperation and group success in spatial public goods games
- The effects of attribute persistence on cooperation in evolutionary games
Cited In (11)
- When greediness and self-confidence meet in a social dilemma
- Evidential reasoning based on imitation and aspiration information in strategy learning promotes cooperation in optional spatial public goods game
- Best response dynamics improve sustainability and equity outcomes in common-pool resources problems, compared to imitation dynamics
- From imitation to collusion: long-run learning in a low-information environment
- How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
- The effects of attribute persistence on cooperation in evolutionary games
- Inertia in spatial public goods games under weak selection
- The effects of nonlinear imitation probability on the evolution of cooperation
- Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching
- Adaptive persistence based on environment comparison enhances cooperation in evolutionary games
- Heterogeneous reputation promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game
This page was built for publication: Persistent imitation paves the way for cooperation in public goods game
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2166509)