When greediness and self-confidence meet in a social dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2023.129033arXiv2307.04044OpenAlexW4384469750MaRDI QIDQ6167734

Chaoqian Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Wenqiang Zhu

Publication date: 7 August 2023

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.04044

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypublic goods gameweak selectionself-confidencebiased allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Cites Work

• Occupation time limit theorems for the voter model
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• Diffusive clustering in the two dimensional voter model
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• Persistent imitation paves the way for cooperation in public goods game
• The replicator equation on graphs
• Games on graphs
• Blocking defector invasion by focusing on the most successful partner
• Inertia in spatial public goods games under weak selection
• A model for spatial conflict
• The Calculus of Selfishness
• Co-evolution of reputation-based preference selection and resource allocation with multigame on interdependent networks

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