When greediness and self-confidence meet in a social dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.PHYSA.2023.129033MaRDI QIDQ6167734zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chaoqian Wang, Wenqiang Zhu, Attila Szolnoki

Publication date 7 August 2023

Published in Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.04044

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypublic goods gameweak selectionself-confidencebiased allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Abstract: A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer in a spatial public goods game to receive a different proportion of goods than other participants. The second aspect influences the micro-level dynamics of strategy updates, wherein players can maintain their strategy with a certain weight. Analytical results are obtained on square lattices under the weak selection limit. If the organizer attempts to monopolize the public goods, cooperation becomes more attainable. If the confidence increases, cooperation is inhibited. Consequently, these elements have conflicting effects on cooperation, and their simultaneous presence can result in a heterogeneous change of the critical synergy factor. Our theoretical findings underscore the subtle implications of a mutual trait that may manifest as greediness or self-confidence under different circumstances, which are validated through Monte Carlo simulations.

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Cited in

(2)

• Bribing the Self
• Greed and fear in multiperson social dilemmas

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