Recommendations
- Asymmetric information in competitive bribery games
- Coalitions in competitive bribery games
- Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium
- Equilibrium solutions of an auction game related to the model of privatization of indivisible boons under conditions of corruption
- Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions of games with uncertainty and imperfect information
Cited in
(9)- Coalitions in competitive bribery games
- Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
- A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
- A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels
- Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games
- Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
- Asymmetric information in competitive bribery games
- Simulation of Bribes and Consequences of Leniency Policy. Results from an Experimental Study
- Bidirectional supervision: an effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games
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