Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
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Publication:1755152
DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2012.02.005zbMATH Open1418.91127OpenAlexW2014418004WikidataQ51805424 ScholiaQ51805424MaRDI QIDQ1755152FDOQ1755152
Authors: Kuiying Deng, Zhuozheng Li, Shun Kurokawa, Tianguang Chu 
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.005
Recommendations
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Promoting cooperation by punishing minority
- Mutual punishment promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
Cites Work
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- The evolution of cooperation
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
- The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
- Positive interactions promote public cooperation
- Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
Cited In (26)
- Spontaneous punishment promotes cooperation in public good game
- The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
- How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
- How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
- Persistent cooperators in nature
- Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
- The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments*
- Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
- Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
- Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- Cooperation, punishment and immigration
- Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
- Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent
- Characteristics of the evolution of cooperation by the probabilistic peer-punishment based on the difference of payoff
- Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
- Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
- Mercenary punishment in structured populations
- Multiple tolerances dilute the second order cooperative dilemma
- Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
- Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
- Bidirectional supervision: an effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games
- Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
- Persistence extends reciprocity
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