Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.005zbMath1418.91127OpenAlexW2014418004WikidataQ51805424 ScholiaQ51805424MaRDI QIDQ1755152

Kuiying Deng, Shun Kurokawa, Tianguang Chu, Zhuozheng Li

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

finite populationevolutionarily stable strategypublic goods gamefixation probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
• Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
• Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
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