Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators

DOI10.1016/J.MBS.2016.09.012zbMATH Open1352.92105OpenAlexW2524400362WikidataQ47382119 ScholiaQ47382119MaRDI QIDQ343053FDOQ343053

Authors: Shun Kurokawa 

Publication date: 21 November 2016

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2016.09.012

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zbMATH Keywords

optimismgenerosityiterated Prisoner's dilemmanicenessreactive strategiesretaliation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12) Animal behavior (92D50)

Cites Work

• The calculus of selfishness.
• Rewarding evolutionary fitness with links between populations promotes cooperation
• The evolution of cooperation
• Dynamic properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
• Multi-player games on the cycle
• Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
• Limitations of inclusive fitness
• Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
• Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general \(n\)-player games and its implications
• Games among relatives revisited
• Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games
• Iterated prisoner's dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
• Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity
• A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions
• Heuristics guide cooperative behaviors in public goods game
• Automata, repeated games and noise
• The evolution of altruism in spatial threshold public goods games via an insurance mechanism
• Evolutionary dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift game
• Structure coefficients and strategy selection in multiplayer games

Cited In (13)

• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
• How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
• How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
• Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players
• Ignorance is bliss, but for whom? The persistent effect of good will on cooperation
• Adaptive tag switching reinforces the coevolution of contingent cooperation and tag diversity
• Involuntary defection and the evolutionary origins of empathy
• Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?
• Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
• Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
• Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
• Persistence extends reciprocity
• The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation

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