Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1712182
DOI10.3390/G9040100zbMath1419.91095OpenAlexW2904225638WikidataQ128766346 ScholiaQ128766346MaRDI QIDQ1712182
Yasuo Ihara, Shun Kurokawa, Joe Yuichiro Wakano
Publication date: 21 January 2019
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040100
2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (3)
Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
- Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
- Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity
- Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
- Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general \(n\)-player games and its implications
- Persistence extends reciprocity
- Robustness against indirect invasions
- Games among relatives revisited
- The evolution of stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
- In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
- Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
- Evolution of cooperation under \(N\)-person snowdrift games
- Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
- Revisiting: ``The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups: continuous reciprocity in the repeated \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
- One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
- Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
- Harsh environments and the evolution of multi-player cooperation
- The evolution of \(n\)-player cooperation -- threshold games and ESS bifurcations
- The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
- Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games
- Direct reciprocity in structured populations
- Limitations of inclusive fitness
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- The public goods game with a new form of shared reward
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
- From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
This page was built for publication: Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions