Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions

DOI10.3390/G9040100zbMath1419.91095OpenAlexW2904225638WikidataQ128766346 ScholiaQ128766346MaRDI QIDQ1712182

Yasuo Ihara, Shun Kurokawa, Joe Yuichiro Wakano

Publication date: 21 January 2019

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040100

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theoryrepeated gameprisoner's dilemmagenerosity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent ⋮ Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option

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