Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002zbMath1403.91034OpenAlexW1990336455WikidataQ39892311 ScholiaQ39892311MaRDI QIDQ1630863
Yasuo Ihara, Shun Kurokawa, Joe Yuichiro Wakano
Publication date: 5 December 2018
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002
mathematical modelcooperationprisoner's dilemmafinite populationsfixation probabilitypublic goods gamesgenerosityone-third law
2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Public goods (91B18) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items
Cites Work
- Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
- The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
- Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
- The Evolution of Cooperation
This page was built for publication: Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors