Persistence extends reciprocity

DOI10.1016/j.mbs.2017.02.006zbMath1366.92136OpenAlexW2588756135WikidataQ38756041 ScholiaQ38756041MaRDI QIDQ518670

Shun Kurokawa

Publication date: 29 March 2017

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2017.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

persistenceevolutionary game theorytrade-offiterated prisoner's dilemmaimperfect informationinvariant of motion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (8)

The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence ⋮ Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence? ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence ⋮ Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option ⋮ How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?

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