Switching costs in frequently repeated games.

DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2655zbMATH1145.91316OpenAlexW2062134357MaRDI QIDQ1587637FDOQ1587637

Authors Barton L. Lipman, Ruqu Wang

Publication date 3 December 2000

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1190.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
• Local interactions under switching costs
• Unilateral commitment in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
• In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs

Cites work

• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
• Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
• Collusion, discounting and dynamic games
• Dynamic coordination games
• Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(20)

• Reputation building through costly adjustment
• Perturbed finitely repeated games
• The price of history-independent strategies in games with inter-temporal externalities
• Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
• Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory
• Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
• Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
• Tempered best response dynamics
• Myopic perception in repeated games
• Local interactions under switching costs
• Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
• Games with switching costs and endogenous references
• Rapid evolution under inertia
• Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• Persistence extends reciprocity
• Agility in repeated games: an example
• Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
• How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
• Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence.

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