Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
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Publication:1587637
DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2655zbMATH Open1145.91316OpenAlexW2062134357MaRDI QIDQ1587637FDOQ1587637
Authors: Barton L. Lipman, Ruqu Wang 
Publication date: 3 December 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1190.pdf
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Cites Work
- Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
- Multi-Period Competition with Switching Costs
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
- Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
- Finitely Repeated Games
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Dynamic coordination games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Collusion, discounting and dynamic games
- Characterizations of the equilibrium payoffs of inertia supergames
Cited In (20)
- Local interactions under switching costs
- Perturbed finitely repeated games
- Finitely repeated games with monitoring options
- Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
- Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs
- How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
- Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
- Games with switching costs and endogenous references
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- Rapid evolution under inertia
- Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence.
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Switching costs in infinitely repeated games
- Reputation building through costly adjustment
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- The price of history-independent strategies in games with inter-temporal externalities
- Agility in repeated games: an example
- Tempered best response dynamics
- Persistence extends reciprocity
- Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory
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