Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World
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Publication:4531001
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00181zbMath1022.91013OpenAlexW2147861731MaRDI QIDQ4531001
David M. Frankel, Ady Pauzner, Krzysztof Burdzy
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1773/2178
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