Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/s10683-007-9183-zzbMath1136.91354OpenAlexW2112074684MaRDI QIDQ2463431

Antonio Cabrales, Roc Armenter, Rosemarie Nagel

Publication date: 6 December 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3472

zbMATH Keywords

Equilibrium selectionCommon knowledgeGlobal gamesRisk dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (10)

COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ⋮ Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games ⋮ The Predominant Role of Signal Precision in Experimental Beauty Contests ⋮ Deep and shallow thinking in the long run ⋮ Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games ⋮ All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study ⋮ Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures ⋮ Coordination after gains and losses: is prospect theory's value function predictive for games? ⋮ Clock games: theory and experiments ⋮ The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: an experimental study

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