Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
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Publication:2212778
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.09.008zbMath1452.91047OpenAlexW3092853244MaRDI QIDQ2212778
Publication date: 24 November 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.008
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