Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
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Publication:1904630
DOI10.1007/BF01211787zbMath0836.90051OpenAlexW1999951084MaRDI QIDQ1904630
Publication date: 2 May 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211787
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Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty., Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study, The simplest rational greater-fool bubble model, (A)symmetric information bubbles: experimental evidence
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