Coordination and delay in global games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.004zbMath1157.91324OpenAlexW2162853770MaRDI QIDQ2373773

Amil Dasgupta

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.004

zbMATH Keywords

coordination failureglobal gamesoption to delay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Games of timing (91A55)

Related Items (max. 100)

Membership in citizen groups ⋮ Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ Vanguards in revolution ⋮ Strategic Delay in Global Games ⋮ Information acquisition in global games of regime change ⋮ Speculative attacks with multiple targets ⋮ Intertemporal coordination with delay options ⋮ Information quality and crises in regime-change games ⋮ Coordination and social learning ⋮ Tractable dynamic global games and applications ⋮ Uncertainty, co-ordination and path dependence ⋮ Dynamic coordination with individual learning ⋮ Overcoming the coordination problem: dynamic formation of networks ⋮ The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: an experimental study ⋮ Game of operation of a telecommunication network of agents with directional antennas ⋮ Coordination with Local Information ⋮ Unnamed Item

Cites Work

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• Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
• Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks

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