Coordination with local information
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Publication:2830747
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1795153
Cites work
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
- Bayesian learning in social networks
- Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities
- Common belief foundations of global games
- Communication and Coordination in Social Networks
- Coordination and delay in global games
- Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
- Network games
- Non-Bayesian social learning
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Strategic information transmission networks
Cited in
(7)- Preface to the special issue on information and decisions in social and economic networks
- Regime change in large information networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7075933 (Why is no real title available?)
- Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators
- The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
- A complementarity model for electric power transmission-distribution coordination under uncertainty
- Coordination with flexible information acquisition
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