Local information hinders coordination in endogenous networks

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110996OpenAlexW4317624016MaRDI QIDQ2685465

Feifei Lu

Publication date: 22 February 2023

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110996

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionnetwork formationlocal informationminimum-effort games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Constrained interactions and social coordination
• Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
• Contagion and efficiency
• Network formation and social coordination
• Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency
• Lock-in through passive connections
• Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation
• Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution
• Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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