Lock-in through passive connections
This paper focuses on lock-in phenomenon in social networks, where payoff is received through passive connections. It is shown that action-heterogeneous network configuration, where different actions are adopted by different agents, are Nash equilibria and can be stochastically stable. The coordination game proposed here captures a conflict between efficiency-consideration and risk-consideration, where one equilibrium is payoff dominant and the other is risk dominant. In the model, the agents decide on an action in a \(2\times2\) coordination game and who choose their active interaction partners through establishing costly links to them, where agents are constrained in the number of links they can create. It is shown that under constrained interactions the payoff received from passive connections can create an endogenous form of lock-in. The absorbing sets of the dynamic process is characterized and a refinement of the set of Nash equilibria is given.
- A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Comment on ``On the co-existence of conventions [J. Econ. Theory 107 (2002) 145-155]
- Competing conventions
- Competition among conventions
- Constrained interactions and social coordination
- Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes
- Contagion
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Network formation and social coordination
- Non-exclusive conventions and social coordination
- On the co-existence of conventions
- On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games.
- Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions
- Social and economic networks.
- Social coordination with locally observable types
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation
- Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation
- The evolution of networks and local public good provision: a potential approach
- Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions
- Local information hinders coordination in endogenous networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1665658 (Why is no real title available?)
- A hybrid revision protocol of action and links and social coordination
- Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution
- Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints
- Homophily in network formation and social coordination
- The structure of interaction and modes of reasoning can shape the evolution of conventions
- Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms
- Long-run efficiency with local interactions and heterogeneous types
This page was built for publication: Lock-in through passive connections
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1995324)
