Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007zbMath1271.91008MaRDI QIDQ2462281

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Simon Weidenholzer

Publication date: 30 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

learning; local interactions; coordination games; mutation; bandwagon properties

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

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