Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities
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Publication:2442855
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Cites work
- A contraction principle for finite global games
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating
- Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
- Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 605729 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs
- Supermodular mechanism design
Cited in
(16)- Stress tests and information disclosure
- Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness
- On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
- Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté
- Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
- Common belief foundations of global games
- Coordination with local information
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- On Tolerance Analysis of Games with Belief Revision
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1168312 (Why is no real title available?)
- Critical types
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Strategic complementarity in games
- Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
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