Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.005zbMath1292.91034OpenAlexW2012370762MaRDI QIDQ2442855

Laurent Mathevet

Publication date: 1 April 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36032/1/MPRA_paper_36032.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

beliefscomplementaritiesrationalizabilityglobal gamesoptimismequilibrium uniquenesstype-sensitivity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites Work

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• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating

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