On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.003zbMath1279.91039OpenAlexW3124790690MaRDI QIDQ665105

Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4559/1/MPRA_paper_4559.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

contagionrationalizabilitycommon prior assumptionbelief potentialhigher-order belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (4)

Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games ⋮ Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities ⋮ On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors ⋮ Robust equilibria under non-common priors

Cites Work

• On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
• Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models
• Robust equilibria under non-common priors
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Strong uniform times and finite random walks
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Stochastic common learning
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• On Choosing and Bounding Probability Metrics
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Finite Order Implications of Common Priors

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