On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
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Cites work
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Agreeing to disagree
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Finite Order Implications of Common Priors
- Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- On Choosing and Bounding Probability Metrics
- On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
- Robust equilibria under non-common priors
- Stochastic common learning
- Strong uniform times and finite random walks
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
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