Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1189697
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90014-JzbMATH Open0765.90091OpenAlexW2007742778MaRDI QIDQ1189697FDOQ1189697
John D. Geanakoplos, Eddie Dekel, Adam Brandenburger
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90014-j
Cites Work
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations
- Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- On existence and non-existence of proper, regular, conditional distributions
- Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
Cited In (22)
- Ambiguous language and common priors
- Cognitive limits and preferences for information
- Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
- Speculation under unawareness
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge
- A generalization of correlated equilibrium: a new protocol
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Unawareness without AU introspection
- On the nonexistence of universal information structures
- On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
- The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs
- Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities
- Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?
- Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus
- Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds
- Agreeing to disagree in infinite information structures
- Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models
- Rational expectations can preclude trades
- Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
- The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
Recommendations
- A generalization of correlated equilibrium: a new protocol π π
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design π π
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games π π
- Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited π π
- Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information π π
- Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents π π
- Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations π π
- Title not available (Why is that?) π π
- Title not available (Why is that?) π π
This page was built for publication: Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1189697)