The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1122-8zbMath1410.91061OpenAlexW2789758825MaRDI QIDQ2417363

Bo Chen, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 12 June 2019

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1122-8

zbMATH Keywords

aggregate informationbinary threshold gamesequential binary tipping point game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
• Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
• Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Network Games
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Sequential Equilibria
• Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
• On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
• A simple model of global cascades on random networks
• Nash equilibria of games when players’ preferences are quasi‐transitive
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Communication and Coordination in Social Networks
• Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
• Admissibility in Games