Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games
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Publication:971896
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0454-0zbMATH Open1187.91020OpenAlexW2031529261MaRDI QIDQ971896FDOQ971896
Authors: Christopher J. Tyson 
Publication date: 17 May 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55208
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Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
- Bargaining and Reputation
- Delay in bargaining games with complete information
- Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
- Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
- Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment
Cited In (6)
- Iterated elimination procedures
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
- The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
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