Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0454-0zbMath1187.91020OpenAlexW2031529261MaRDI QIDQ971896

Christopher J. Tyson

Publication date: 17 May 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55208

zbMATH Keywords

weak dominancecorecoalitionbackward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game ⋮ Iterated elimination procedures

Cites Work

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• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
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• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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