Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0454-0MaRDI QIDQ971896zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christopher J. Tyson

Publication date 17 May 2010

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55208

zbMATH Keywords

corebackward inductionweak dominancecoalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3543895 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3090557 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• Delay in bargaining games with complete information
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment
• Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
• Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(7)

• On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
• A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes
• The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• An implementation of the Nash bargaining solution by iterated strict dominance
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860917 (Why is no real title available?)
• Iterated elimination procedures

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