An implementation of the Nash bargaining solution by iterated strict dominance

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.108960zbMATH Open1431.91179OpenAlexW3000151242WikidataQ126318874 ScholiaQ126318874MaRDI QIDQ2300367FDOQ2300367

Authors: Shiran Rachmilevitch 

Publication date: 27 February 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108960

Recommendations

• Implementation of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization
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zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargainingiterated strict dominanceNash demand game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• The bargaining problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Divide-the-dollar game revisited
• Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games

Cited In (6)

• On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
• Reasonable Nash demand games
• (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games
• Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
• Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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