An implementation of the Nash bargaining solution by iterated strict dominance

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.108960MaRDI QIDQ2300367zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Shiran Rachmilevitch

Publication date 27 February 2020

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108960

zbMATH Keywords

iterated strict dominanceNash bargainingNash demand game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Divide-the-dollar game revisited
• Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games
• The bargaining problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

Cited in

(10)

• Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
• Reasonable Nash demand games
• (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1210331 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
• A note on the risk dominance of the Nash demand game
• Using ultimatum power as a leverage in resolving a bargaining conflict
• Nash's demand game and resource-allocation
• Very weakly dominant strategies
• Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

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