Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.06.011MaRDI QIDQ1007334zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Duggan, Seok-ju Cho

Publication date 20 March 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.011

zbMATH Keywords

anti-folk theorembargainingmedian voter theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
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• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
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Cites work

• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3562121 (Why is no real title available?)
• Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
• The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model

Cited in

(15)

• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
• A note on uniqueness of electoral equilibrium when the median voter is unobserved
• Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem
• Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
• A Median Voter Model of Social Security
• Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
• A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
• The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
• Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
• One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
• Endogenous voting agendas
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition
• A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
• Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

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