Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
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Publication:1007334
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3562121 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Legislative Coalitions in a Bargaining Model with Externalities
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
- The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
- The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Cited in
(15)- The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
- A note on uniqueness of electoral equilibrium when the median voter is unobserved
- Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games
- A Median Voter Model of Social Security
- Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem
- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities
- Endogenous voting agendas
- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
- Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
- A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
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