Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
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Publication:1599824
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2820zbMath1051.91009OpenAlexW2094829566MaRDI QIDQ1599824
Publication date: 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2820
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