Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0486-1MaRDI QIDQ647548zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yves Breitmoser

Publication date 23 November 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0486-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
• Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
• Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining
• Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
• Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
• Legislative bargaining with teams
• Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers
• Demand bargaining in legislatures
• Equality in legislative bargaining
• Committees, sequential voting and transparency

Cites work

• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
• Endogenous voting agendas
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Non-cooperative bargaining in natural monopolies
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Waiting to settle: multilateral bargaining with subjective biases

Cited in

(6)

• Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
• Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
• The part-time parliament
• Bargaining in legislatures: a new donation paradox
• Distortion-free logrolling mechanism
• Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol

This page was built for publication: Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q647548)