Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
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Recommendations
- Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
Cited in
(34)- Demand bargaining in legislatures
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
- Reaching across the aisle to block reforms
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
- Personal power dynamics in bargaining
- The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
- On dynamic compromise
- Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
- Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo
- Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model
- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- The legislative calendar
- Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5997456 (Why is no real title available?)
- Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
- Spending-biased legislators: discipline through disagreement
- Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
- Bargaining over the budget
- Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining
- Empowering of candidates and parties in single term vs re-election schemes
- BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
- Leadership ability and agenda choice
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
- Bargaining in legislatures: a new donation paradox
- Endogenous limits on veto power in dynamic bargaining
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Optimal democratic mechanisms: should minorities propose first?
- Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
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