Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108699zbMath1425.91199OpenAlexW2975871397MaRDI QIDQ2334314

Tomohiko Kawamori

Publication date: 7 November 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108699

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingbreakdownendogenous status quorelevance to Rubinstein bargaining gamevanishing effect of status quo

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Bargaining in a long-term relationship with endogenous termination
• On dynamic compromise
• Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

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