On dynamic compromise

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.009zbMath1250.91037OpenAlexW3021981063MaRDI QIDQ2276544

Zaki Zahran, T. Renee Bowen

Publication date: 6 November 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.009

zbMATH Keywords

Markov equilibriadynamic legislative bargainingcompromise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (13)

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games ⋮ Two-party competition with persistent policies ⋮ Fully absorbing dynamic compromise ⋮ The dynamics of distributive politics ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ⋮ Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause ⋮ Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power ⋮ Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo ⋮ Personal power dynamics in bargaining ⋮ Zero-sum stochastic games with random rules of priority, discrete linear-quadratic model

Cites Work

• The dynamics of distributive politics
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
• A Theory of Constitutional Standards and Civil Liberty
• Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
• Markov Chains
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games

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