Dynamic legislative policy making

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Publication:449169


DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.015zbMath1247.91073MaRDI QIDQ449169

Tasos Kalandrakis, John Duggan

Publication date: 12 September 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.015


91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A25: Dynamic games


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