Dynamic legislative policy making
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Publication:449169
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.015zbMath1247.91073OpenAlexW2144487326MaRDI QIDQ449169
Tasos Kalandrakis, John Duggan
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.015
Related Items (27)
Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ A bargaining model of endogenous procedures ⋮ The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ On optimal group claims at voting in a stochastic environment ⋮ Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter ⋮ Two-party competition with persistent policies ⋮ Fully absorbing dynamic compromise ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ The dynamics of distributive politics ⋮ A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy ⋮ Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective ⋮ A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities ⋮ On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players ⋮ Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria ⋮ Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, \& endogenous institutions ⋮ Bargaining over the budget ⋮ A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games ⋮ On dynamic compromise ⋮ Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players ⋮ Simple collective equilibria in stopping games ⋮ Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power ⋮ Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model ⋮ Personal power dynamics in bargaining
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