Dynamic legislative policy making
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Publication:449169
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.01.015zbMATH Open1247.91073OpenAlexW2144487326MaRDI QIDQ449169FDOQ449169
Authors: John Duggan, Tasos Kalandrakis 
Publication date: 12 September 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.015
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Cites Work
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- Legislative bargaining with reconsideration
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Cited In (34)
- Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
- Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
- Two-party competition with persistent policies
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
- Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective
- Bargaining over the budget
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- Political business cycles in a dynamic bipartisan voting model
- On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice
- The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
- The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
- Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
- A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
- Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, \& endogenous institutions
- On dynamic compromise
- Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
- Computing perfect stationary equilibria in stochastic games
- The legislative calendar
- Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
- BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
- Sequential legislative lobbying
- Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
- Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
- Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions
- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
- A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities
- On optimal group claims at voting in a stochastic environment
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
- Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Personal power dynamics in bargaining
- Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
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