Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.07.004zbMATH Open1347.91122OpenAlexW2124717068MaRDI QIDQ495657FDOQ495657

Dan Bernhardt, Brett Graham

Publication date: 15 September 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/70518/1/WRAP_Congress_May_4_2015%20%252800000002%2529.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingvoting rulesagenda settingdelegated decision makingsupermajority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Competence and Ideology
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
• The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• Voting on Majority Rules

Cited In (2)

• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations

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