Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.07.004MaRDI QIDQ495657zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brett Graham, Dan Bernhardt

Publication date 15 September 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/70518/1/WRAP_Congress_May_4_2015%20%252800000002%2529.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingvoting rulesagenda settingdelegated decision makingsupermajority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)

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• Endogenous Political Institutions
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1739768 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 859030 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Newton collocation method for solving dynamic bargaining games
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Competence and ideology
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• The coalitional Nash bargaining solution
• Voting on Majority Rules

Cited in

(3)

• Optimal checks and balances under policy uncertainty
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations

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