Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01285-xzbMath1476.91054OpenAlexW3034808808MaRDI QIDQ2059052

Marco Faravelli, Priscilla T. Y. Man

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01285-x

zbMATH Keywords

costly votingsupermajorityPoisson gamecompulsory votingvoter turnoutqualified majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing ⋮ Welfare-improving misreported polls ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise

Cites Work

• Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing
• Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• On the rate of multivariate Poisson convergence
• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Voting on Majority Rules
• Linear Voting Rules
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

This page was built for publication: Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations