Welfare-improving misreported polls
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Publication:6107367
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 997340 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484942 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3238721 (Why is no real title available?)
- A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
- Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
- Convergence within binary market scoring rules
- Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
- Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
- Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
- Pointwise versions of the maximum theorem with applications in optimization
- Public information and electoral bias
- The Frequency Distribution of the Difference Between Two Poisson Variates Belonging to Different Populations
- The binarized scoring rule
- Welfare reducing polls
Cited in
(9)- A political economy model of the Ganges pollution cleanup problem
- Pre-election polling and third party candidates
- Framing the rabbit to snare the votes
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Weekday-only polling and partisan support levels: evidence from New Zealand
- Polling in a proportional representation system
- The welfare effects of public opinion polls
- Welfare reducing polls
- Inference from biased polls
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