Welfare-improving misreported polls
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Publication:6107367
DOI10.1007/S00199-022-01413-9zbMATH Open1520.91139OpenAlexW4211009677MaRDI QIDQ6107367FDOQ6107367
Authors: Felipe R. Durazzo, David Turchick 
Publication date: 3 July 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01413-9
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Cites Work
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Cited In (9)
- A political economy model of the Ganges pollution cleanup problem
- Pre-election polling and third party candidates
- Framing the rabbit to snare the votes
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Weekday-only polling and partisan support levels: evidence from New Zealand
- Polling in a proportional representation system
- The welfare effects of public opinion polls
- Welfare reducing polls
- Inference from biased polls
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