Optimal checks and balances under policy uncertainty

DOI10.1111/IERE.12547MaRDI QIDQ5042677zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabriele Gratton, Massimo Morelli

Publication date 25 October 2022

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12547

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Expert advising under checks and balances
• Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
• Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?
• Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power
• Endogenous Political Institutions

Cited in

(4)

• Expert advising under checks and balances
• Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?
• ERRATUM: OPTIMAL CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER POLICY UNCERTAINTY
• Can checks and balances discipline anti-pandering politicians?

This page was built for publication: Optimal checks and balances under policy uncertainty

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5042677)