Endogenous Political Institutions

DOI10.1162/0033553041382148MaRDI QIDQ3159694zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, Francesco Trebbi

Publication date 16 February 2005

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17704/1/17704.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

leaderslegislation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Endogenous institutions and political extremism
• Endogenous formation of political parties
• Ideology and endogenous constitutions
• Endogenous political competition and political accountability
• A model of endogenous political party platforms
• ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS
• Endogenous voting agendas
• Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

Cited in

(16)

• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Education, corruption, and the distribution of income
• Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
• Ideology and endogenous constitutions
• Political selection and the optimal concentration of political power
• Polarization in networks: identification-alienation framework
• The legislative calendar
• Endogenous institutions and political extremism
• The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures
• Vote-buying and growth
• Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
• Optimal checks and balances under policy uncertainty
• Institutions and growth in limited access societies
• On the limits of democracy
• Critical decisions and constitutional rules
• Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses

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