Endogenous voting agendas
From MaRDI portal
Publication:857975
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0143-xzbMath1142.91423OpenAlexW2034002335MaRDI QIDQ857975
Publication date: 5 January 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0143-x
Related Items (3)
DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE: COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION AND OBSTRUCTION ⋮ Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members ⋮ The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees
- On the core of voting games
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
- Equilibrium agenda formation
- Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
This page was built for publication: Endogenous voting agendas
