The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates
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Publication:2268366
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3910084 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
- A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
- A theory of voting in large elections
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Endogenous voting agendas
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- Fixed-point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex Topological Linear Spaces
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
- The Theory of Max-Min, with Applications
- ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
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