The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates
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Publication:2268366
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0396-2zbMath1201.91052MaRDI QIDQ2268366
Publication date: 5 March 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0396-2
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